Chapter 3: State Labor Law by Segal, Robert M.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1973 Article 6
1-1-1973
Chapter 3: State Labor Law
Robert M. Segal
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Segal, Robert M. (1973) "Chapter 3: State Labor Law," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1973, Article 6.
CHAPTER J 
State Labor Law 
ROBERT M. SEGAL • 
§3.1. Introduction. While the United States Supreme Court decided 
ten cases in the labor law field during the past year,1 the Supreme 
Juclicial Court of Massachusetts decided six such cases which, unlike 
the areas covered by its federal counterpart, dealt primarily with issues 
dealing with the state's collective bargaining laws for municipal2 and 
hospital employees. Notably, the Supreme Judicial Court gave a broad 
interpretation to the jurisdiction of the state's Labor Commission while 
also indicating an increased judicial deference to arbitration. In addition, 
the court decided issues involving agency fees and union certification, 
• RoBERT M. SEGAL is a partner in the law firm of Segal, Roitman &: Coleman in 
Boston. He is co-chairman of the Labor Law Committee of the Boston Bar Association, 
former chairman of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American Bar Association 
and a lecturer on Labor Law at the Boston College Law School and the Harvard Busi-
ness School. Mr. Segal wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance given him by 
George B. Washington, an associate in the law firm of Segal, Roitman &: Coleman. 
The author would like to point out intially that the heavy concentration of public 
employees cases has recently led the Massachusetts General Court to enact a statute 
which will soon reshape the entire field. See Acts of 1973, c. 1078. 
§3.1. 1 In the three cases involving the NLRA, the Court dealt with the right of 
unions to fine members, the problem of the reasonableness of the fines, and the rights 
of strikers to reinstatement. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board Textile Workers, Local 
1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); NLRB v. Inter-
national Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972). 
The two cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act were: Employees of Dep't of 
Public Health&: Welfare v. Dep't of Public Health &: Welfare, 4ll U.S. 279 (1973); and 
Brennan v. Arnheim &: Neely Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973) • 
. The Supreme Court attempted to define the areas of permissible union activity in 
political affairs in U.S. Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 
U.S. 548 (197!1); and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
The remaining cases involved the internal affairs of unions, the Hobbs Act, civil rights 
and state laws requiring employer payments for jury duty. See, respectively, Hall v. 
Cole, 410 U.S. 904 (1973); U.S. v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 4ll U.S. 792 (1973); Dean v. Gadden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 
543 (1973). 
2 See Chapter 6 of 1971 Annual Survey of Mass. Law, for a full treatment of the issues 
arising in this relatively new area of labor relations law. Indeed, many of the cases 
decided during the past Survey year are both legally and factually similar to the issues 
discussed in the earlier article. 
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which vitally affect the collective bargaining powers of municipal 
employees. The new Massachusetts Appeals Court also decided one im-
portant case involving the power of cities and towns to enter into multi-
year collective bargaining contracts. In addition, the Massachusetts Labor 
Relations Commmission handed down several important decisions in the 
municipal labor law field and adopted several NLRB precedents. It is 
significant to note that many of these Commission decisions appear to 
place increased reliance upon arbitration procedures as an integral 
element in the collective bargaining process. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§3.2. Jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission. 
In American National Red Cross v. Labor Relations Commission? the 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Labor Commission's assertion of 
jurisdiction under chapter 150A over a petition for representation of a 
unit of registered nurses employed by the Massachusetts Red Cross Blood 
Program (Red Cross). Relying on a previous United States Supreme 
Court decision holding that the Red Cross was a "Federal instrumental-
ity" and thus not subject to state taxation,2 the Red Cross filed a motion 
before the Commission urging that the Massachusetts Red Cross was 
immune from regulation under the state's labor laws. When the Commis-
sion denied this motion, the Red Cross filed for a writ of prohibitions 
attempting to prevent the Commission from asserting jurisdiction. 
Presumably since the Red Cross's writ attacked the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, the court, without discussing the propriety of reviewing 
a mere denial of a motion by the Commission, proceeded to consider the 
merits of the Red Cross's claim directly.4 The court noted that there 
was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the 
Red Cross was both an "employer" and a "health care facility" within 
the meaning of sections 2(2) and 2(10) of chapter 150A.5 The court 
asserted that the Red Cross's admitted immunity from state taxation did 
not confer a general immunity from state regulation.8 In support of this, 
it was noted that the Red Cross's enabling legislation itself states that 
the organization is authorized to promulgate regulations "not incon-
sistent with the laws of the United States of America or any state 
§3.2. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 699, 296 N.E.2d 214. 
2 Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 555 (1966). 
s Pursuant to G.L. 211, §3, the Supreme Judicial Court may issue a writ of prohibi-
tion, which will preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal. 
4 Cf. City Manager v. Labor Relations Commission, 353 Mass. 519, 233 N.E.2d 310; 
Harrison v. Labor Relations Commission, 1973, Mass. Adv. Sh. 723, 296 N.E.2d 196 
(1973). 
5 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 702, 296 N.E.2d at 217. 
8 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 703, 296 N.E.2d at 218. 
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thereof."1 Reasoning that the application of the state labor laws would 
not impede or burden the Red Cross in the performance of its govern-
mental functions, the court held that there was no reason for immunizing 
the Red Cross from the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission.s While American National Red Cross is an important deci-
sion which appears to give considerable breadth to the regulatory au-
thority of the Labor Commission, the particularly independent nature 
of the state Red Cross Blood Program and its receipt of the bulk of its 
funds from employers admittedly subject to the Commission's jurisdic-
tion may well limit the scope and import of this decision as to other 
federal "instrumentalities" which would otherwise be subject to state 
supervision. 
§3.3. Municipal labor law: The status of "executive officers" and 
"supervisors" in certification proceedings. In Harrison v. Labor Rela-
tions Commission,t the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Massachu-
setts Labor Relations Commission's dismissal of a petition for certifica-
tion filed by the Boston Fire Chiefs' Association. The first petition which 
was filed with the Commission sought a representation election of a 
unit including the Boston Fire Department's assistant chiefs, deputy 
chiefs and district chiefs. The Commission found that the assistant 
chiefs fell into the narrow category of "executive officers" within the 
meaning of G.L. c. 149, §178G and that the unit was therefore not 
appropriate. Thus, by terming these personnel "executive officers" rather 
than mere "supervisors," the Commission avoided many of the difficulties 
encountered at the federal level in defining the ambiguous status of 
"supervisory employees."2 
When the Association filed a second petition seeking certification for 
only the deputy and district chiefs, the Commission found that these 
too were "executive officers," and it accordingly dismissed the petition 
once again. The Association filed a bill for judicial review under G.L. 
c. 30A, §14, and the superior court remanded the case to the Commission 
on the grounds that "the rights of the parties might have been prejudiced 
by arbitrary and capricious action .... "3 The Commission reaffirmed its 
earlier decision, and upon appeal the superior court reversed, finding 
that the deputy chiefs and district chiefs were "supervisory officers" but 
7 Id. at 705, 296 N.E.2d at 219, quoting 36 U.S.C. §2 (1970). 
8 Id. at 701, 296 N.E.2d at 216. Since the NLRB had already dismissed the petition 
seeking an election at the Red Cross's Blood Program, there was no question of actual or 
potential federal jurisdiction. 
§3.3. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 723, 296 N.E.2d 196 (1973). 
2 See §12(3), 2(11) and 14(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§152(3), 
(11) and 164(a) (1970). 
a 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 724, 296 N.E.2d at 198. 
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not "executive officers.'~' After further proceedings, the city appealed 
to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The court first decided the threshold question of whether the Com-
mission's dismissal of the certification petition was ripe for judicial 
review. It should be noted that under National Labor Relations Board 
practice such a dismissal would not be ripe for judicial review.11 Indeed, 
under the federal system, the aggrieved party must await the commission 
of an unfair labor practice before review will be granted.8 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Judicial Court, in City Manager v. Labor Relations Com-
mission,7 decided in 1968, qualified this federal principle by creating two 
exceptions to the general rule that such dismissals are not ripe for 
judicial review under state law: first, where there are "extraordinary 
circumstances" making certification questions ones of "vital significance"; 
and second, where there are questions raised as to the Commission's juri&-
diction.s 
In Harrison, the court allowed review on the grounds that the parties 
had not argued the ripeness issue as well as "in view of our opinion on 
the merits."9 Presumably, this latter comment can be interpreted as an 
indication that d1e court found the certification questions raised in 
Harrison to be of "vital significance." However, since the court did not 
refer explicitly to this standard, doubt remains as to the precise circum-
stances under which a certification petition is reviewable by the courts. 
On the other hand, it appears that partier-where they by agreement or 
otherwise do not argue the ripeness issue-will be able to obtain direct 
judicial review of at least some of the Commission's determinations on 
the appropriateness of bargaining units. 
On the merits, the Harrison court reversed the superior court and 
affirmed the Commission's decision that both the deputy chiefs and the 
district chiefs of the Boston Fire Department were "executive officers.'' 
In the City of Medford case, the Supreme Judicial Court had affirmed 
a Commission finding that the 6 deputy chiefs of the 154 uniformed 
members of the Medford Fire Department were executive officers. Adopt-
ing a sort of numerical ratio rule, the court noted that the Boston Fire 
Department had over 1900 uniformed members, and it therefore held 
4 The distinction between "executive officers" and "supervisory employees" is not an 
easy one to draw. It is, however, generally accepted that the former category is not 
as enoompassing as the latter. For a definition of supervisors, see 29 U.S.C. §152(11) 
(1970). 
II See AFL v. NLRB, 808 U.S. 401 (1940). 
8 Id. at 404,407. 
7 !15!1 Mass. 519, 2!1!1 N.E.2d !110 (1968). 
8 Id. at 524, 2!13 N.E.2d at lllll-14. It appears from this decision that the court will 
determine what oonstitutes "extraordinary circumstances" on an ad hoc basis. J~. 
9 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 726, 296 N.E.2d at 199. 
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that "on this basis alone" it was reasonable to conclude that the twelve 
deputy chiefs were executive officers.1o 
With regard to the 55 district chiefs, the court admitted that the issue 
of their inclusion in the bargaining unit presented a more doubtful 
question. Quoting from the Commission's opinion, the court asserted 
that the district chiefs "are not working with the rank and file officers," 
but are rather an "exten~on of the chief."ll The court also adopted the 
following reasoning of the Commission: 
"For this reason they are entitled to the more elaborate emoluments 
of their rank; the respect and attention of command; the indepen-
dent discretion and exercise of their individual judgment on a daily 
basis." Their "mobility • • . , the chauffeur-driven vehicles, the parti-
cipation in the development of departmental policy, their duty to 
implement and carry out these policies, separate them from the rest 
of the group."12 
The combination of all these factors was deemed to constitute evidence 
substantial enough to justify the Commission's finding that the district 
chiefs were indeed "executive officers." · 
Under federal labor law, supervisors must be excluded from the 
bargaining unit.1s While supervisors are not explicitly excluded from 
municipal bargaining units under section I78G of chapter 149, the 
Harrison decision may accomplish this result sub silentio. Since, on the 
average, each Boston district chief supervises about thirty-five uniformed 
men, he is in fact closer to a supervisor than he is to the head of a 
department or to another executive officer. All supervisors possess at 
least some of the attributes which the court found made the district 
chiefs an "extension of the Chief." If the Commission continues to 
exclude officials on the level of district chiefs, the courts may be forced 
as a result of the Harrison decision to allow the de facto exclusion of 
10 The court's determination h~ was based not on any abstract legal definitions, 
but simply on the numerical ratios involved. See id. at 727, 296 N.E.2d at 199. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. Section 3 of dlapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973 appears to cast some doubt on the 
continuing validity of this decision. Section 3 provides that only the Fire Commissioner 
and the Chief of the Department are to be classified as professional employees. The 
clear implication of this provision is that deputy and district chiefs are non-professional 
employees, who, unlike "executive officers," can avail themselves of the benefits of 
union membership. 
18 29 U.S.C. §§152(11), 164(a) (1970). This policy avoids many difficult situations which 
would otherwise arise if a supervisor were subject to oonflicting obligations to both the 
union and management. See, e.g., IBEW v. NLRB, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1972) (union discipline 
of supervisors for strikebreaking). When, however, chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973 
goes into effect, some difficult problems will likely arise as the result of the very narrow 
definition of professional firefighting employees provided for in §3 of that Act. 
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some supervisors from municipal bargaining units. Municipal bargaining 
units will consequently be placed in a position similar to that of unions 
subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 
Whether this result is desirable in light of the limited arsenal of bargain-
ing capability possessed by municipal employees is, of course, open to 
debate. 
§3.4. Municipal labor law: Agency service fees and municipal con-
tracts. In Karchmar v. City of Worcester,l the court upheld the validity 
of a municipal contract providing for the payment of agency service 
fees by all employees within the bargaining unit. While G.L. c. 149, 
§178L explicitly recognizes that a city may agree to require the deduction 
of such a fee as a condition of employment, the City of Worcester con-
tended that this provision should not apply to those employees covered 
by Civil Service. The city argued that the agency shop provision would 
"diminish the authority and power of the Civil Service Commission"2 
as prescribed by G.L. c. 149, §178N. 
The court rejected the city's arguments and held that legislative his-
tory clearly demonstrated that the provisions of §178L permitting the 
deduction of agency service fees applied to all employees in the bargain-
ing unit, including those covered by Civil Service. The Legislature re-
tained the power to amend the conditions of public employment, "either 
by amending G.L. c. 31 (the Civil Service statutes), or by inserting 
appropriate provisions in other chapters of . the General Laws."B By 
authorizing cities to enter into contracts providing for mandatory agency 
service fees, the Legislature was deemed merely to have exercised its 
power to alter the conditions of public employment and not to have 
"diminish[ed] the authority and power of the civil service commission" 
within the meaning of G.L. c. 149, §178N.• 
§3.5. Scope of judicial review in labor cases. In Albert Greene v. 
§!1.4. 1 197!1 Mass. Adv. Sh. 122!1, !101 N.E.2d 570. 
2 Id. at 12!10, !101 N.E.2d at 575. 
a Id. at 12!11, !101 N.E.2d at 576. 
• Id. In the Karchmar case, the court also rejected the city's argument that requiring 
the payment of agency fees would violate the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the city's pleadings in the lower court had not 
raised the constitutional challenge, and since the attorney general had not been notified 
of the declaratory judgment's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute (as 
required by G.L c. 2lllA, §8), the city was not permitted to raise its constitutional 
challenges before the Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 12!14, !101 N.E.2d at 578. Although 
the court felt that it was therefore "not required" to "examine the somewhat obscure 
constitutional argument" of the city, the court nonetheless did examine this argument 
and "conclude[d] that it is without merit." Id. Again, it is suggested that the reader 
refer to chapter 1078 of the Acts of 197!1, which deals at length with the problem of 
agency fees discussed in this case. Unlike some sections, however, §12 of chapter 1078 
appears to reaffirm the right of the employer to collect agency fees if the collective 
bargaining agreement so provides. See Acts of 197!1, c. 1078, 1§12, 17G. 
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Gari i:r Sons,1 the Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed prior decisions 
limiting the scope of judicial review of labor arbitration decisions: 
In the absence of fraud, arbitrary conduct, or procedural irregularity 
in the hearings, the court's determination is confined largely to 
whether the arbitrator's award conforms to the terms of reference 
submitted to him by the parties.2 
The courts are not to substitute their own interpretation of the contract 
in place of the arbitrator's interpretation, and even if the arbitrator's 
award is not supported by the evidence, the courts should still avoid 
upsetting his award.s 
Also, in a rescript opinion handed down in the case of Tammany Hall 
v. Garrity,• new strength was given to the principlell that while a party 
can appeal the granting or denial of a temporary restraining order in a 
labor dispute to a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
decision of that single justice is not itself a "final decree"6 and is thus 
not subject to appeal to the full Supreme Judicial Court. 
§3.6. Municipal labor law: The validity of multi-year collective bar-
gaining contracts. In Mendes v. City of Taunton? the new Appeals 
Court held that the City of Taunton could not pay to firemen and 
policemen the wage increases due them in the second year of their 
collective bargaining contracts with the city. In August, 1971, the former 
mayor of the city and the two unions involved executed contracts provid-
ing for wage increases in 1971 and 1972. In that same month, the City 
Council passed an ordinance implementing this agreement and, in 
September, provided the necessary funds. 
The present mayor claimed that under G.L. c. 44, §33A no ordinance 
providing for an increase in the wages of city employees could be effective 
"unless it is to be operative for more than three months during the 
financial year in which it is passed .... "2 The mayor refused to pay the 
§ll.5. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1699, 289 N.E.2d 860 (1972). 
2 ld. at 1701, 289 N.E.2d at 862. 
s Section 8 of chapter 1078 of the Acts of 197ll also places a strict limitation on the 
scope of judicial review. It provides that at the request of either party to the dispute, 
the Commission may order binding arbitration which will be the exclusive method of 
resolving grievances. In addition, police and fire fighters are required to submit 
irreconcilable disputes to binding arbitration. Under both circumstances, courts will be 
obliged to respect the decision of the arbitrator absent extraordinary impropriety 
or lack of substantial evidence. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 180!1, 289 N.E.2d 845. 
II See Mengel v. Superior Court, lllll Mass. 2ll8, 47 N.E.2d ll (194ll); Thayer Co. v. 
Binnal, !126 Mass. 467, 95 N.E.2d 19!1 (1950). 
6 See G.L. c. 214, §9A(6). 
§ll.6. 1 197ll Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 579, liOl N.E.2d 580. 
2 ld. at 581, liOl N.E.2d at 58ll. 
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increases due in 1972, and the two unions each filed a bill for declaratory 
relief seeking payment of the wages under the collective agreement and 
the enabling ordinance. In addition, the police union filed unfair labor 
practice charges with the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission. 
While the Commission found for the unions,s the superior court re-
versed this decision and denied relief to the police and firemen in their 
actions for declaratory relief. All three cases were consolidated for deci-
sion by the Appeals Court.' 
The Appeals Court construed G.L. c. 44, §33A as requiring "that both 
the ordinance and all salary increases provided therein must be in effect 
for more than three months during the financial year in which the 
ordinance is passed."11 Noting that if, under the municipal collective-
bargaining law, an agreement conflicts with any law or ordinance, the law 
or ordinance shall prevail,8 the court held that section 33A was control-
ling and therefore denied the bargained-for pay increases to the two 
unions. Even though the collective bargaining statute authorizes agree-
ment for up to three years,'~ section 33A was regarded as prohibiting the 
payment of such a second-year wage increase. 
In a well-argued dissent, Judge Goodman maintained that section 
33A should be interpreted to require the ordinance, not the pay increase 
itself, to be in effect for at least three months during the year in which 
it was passed. Furthermore, since cities could enter into other forms 
of multi-year contracts without obtaining full funding in the first year, 
and since they could provide "for the attainment of . . . maximum 
salaries by periodical step-rate increases based on length of service," they 
should also be able to bind themselves to pay increases in future years 
under a collective bargaining contract.s It was also observed that if city 
officials should abuse this power in an election year, this abuse could 
be corrected by the court under section 33A.D 
The majority in Mendes, however, rejected these arguments and has 
thus brought it about that municipal unions will not be able to secure 
ordinances guaranteeing the increases provided for in the second and 
s In re City of Taunton, Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, Case No. MUP-
346, December 6, 1972. 
' 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 579, 301 N.E.2d 580. 
II Id. at 582, 301 N.E.2d at 58!1. 
e Id. at 58!1, !101 N.E.2d at 584, citing G.L. c. 149, §1781. Section 7(f) of c. 1078 of the 
Acts of 197!1 would appear to call for a different result. The new law states that when 
there is a ronflict between the terms of the rollective bargaining agreement and any 
municipal personnel ordinance, by-law, rule or regulation, the former shall prevail. 
'I G.L. c. 149, §1781. 
8 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 586, !101 N.E.2d at 585 (dissenting opinion), quoting 
G.L. c. 41, §108A. 
9 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 589, !101 N.E.2d at 587 (dissenting opinion). Pur-
suant to G.L c. 44, §!l!lA, once city officials submit the annual budget, salary increases 
are forbidden unless provided for in a supplemental budget. 
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third years of multi-year contracts. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
the court did not decide whether a city administration would be fore-
closed from binding itself to seek the necessary enabling ordinances 
during the second and third years of multi-year contracts. The result, 
in any event, serves to illustrate the formidable obstacles facing municipal 
employees in securing collective bargaining agreements that are effective 
as well as equitable. 
B. MASSACHUSETIS LABOR RELATIONS CoMMISSION DEciSIONs• 
§3.7. Adoption of NLRB precedents: Deference to arbitration and 
the Collyer principle. In perhaps its most important decision of the 
year, the Cohasset School Committee1 case, the Massachusetts Labor Re-
lations Commission held that, subject to some ill-defined limitations and 
qualifications, it would defer action on unfair labor practice charges 
where the disputed issues were susceptible of resolution under arbitra-
tion provisions in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties 
and where there was no reason to believe that resolution by arbitration 
would be inconsistent with Massachusetts labor policies. Thus, the Com-
mission adopted, in large part, the deferral policy announced by the 
NLRB in Collyer Insulated Wire.2 
In the Cohasset School Committee case, the Cohasset Teachers' Asso-
ciation charged that the school committee had unilaterally instituted 
changes in working conditions in violation of sections 178H and 178L of 
chapter 149.a In reply, the school committee urged that its Teacher 
Evaluation Program was not a mandatory subject of bargaining, i.e., one 
involving "wages, hours or working conditions,''4 and that, in any case, 
since the Association had grieved the evaluation program under the 
collective bargaining agreement, the Commission should defer action 
pending the resolution of this grievance.6 
Accepting the committee's argument, the Commission deferred to the 
grievance arbitration provisions of the contract. The. Commission, like 
the NLRB in Collyer, found deferral justified in view of what has in-
creasingly become a state policy in favor of resolving grievances through 
• The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance rendered by Alexander Mac-
Millan, Esq., Chairman of the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission in assem-
bling the important MLRC decisions of the past year. 
§3.7. 1 Cohasset School Committee, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973. 
2 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 LR.R.M. 1931 (1971). 
3 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 1-2. 
4 See G.L c. 149, §20C. 
G Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 3. 
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the arbitration process.e Like the NLRB, the Commission retained 
limited jurisdiction so that it could act if: 
(1) The dispute is not, with reasonable promptness, resolved by the 
grievance arbitration process; (2) The grievance and arbitration 
procedures have not been fair or regular; (3) The result is repugnant 
to the state labor relations collective bargaining laws found in the 
policies of Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, Chapter 149.7 
The Commission surveyed the NLRB precedents subsequent to Collyer 
and indicated that, like the Board, the Commission would interpret the 
deferral policy broadly. The policy will be applied whether the unfair 
labor practice charge is brought by the union or the company8 and 
regardless of whether an arbitration decision will have been issued.9 The 
Commission will also defer to arbitration even if no substantive contract 
provisions are involved: 
[T]he Commission, similarly to the NLRB, will defer a dispute 
which is subject to the contract grievance and arbitration proce-
dures even though it does not involve any substantive contract 
provisions and even though no reasonable construction of the sub-
stantive provisions of the contract would preclude a finding that 
the disputed conduct violated the Act.10 
Following this policy, the Commission, like the NLRB, will, at least 
in some circumstances, defer to arbitration even in cases where a dis-
charge is allegedly based on discrimination against union membership 
and where the only contractual provision involved is the prohibition of 
discharges without just cause.11 Apparently, subject to the limitations de-
6 Judicial deference to arbitration is becoming more pronounced in the field of labor 
relations. For a discussion of the effects of Collyer, see Comment, 1971-1972 Annual 
Survey of Labor Relations Law, 1!1 B.C. Ind.&: Com. L Rev. 1M7, 1376-81 (1972). The 
new Massachusetts law dealing with the collective bargaining rights of public employers 
also places heavy emphasis upon arbitration procedures. Indeed, such an emphasis is 
particularly appropriate, given proper safeguards, in this area since municipal employees 
are afforded very few weapons to counter the superior bargaining power of their govern-
mental employers. See Acts of 1973, c. 1078, §§8, 9. 
'1 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 7. 
8 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 10-ll, citing National Biscuit Com-
pany, 198 N.L.R.B. No.4, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 770, 83 L.R.R.M. 2612 
(2nd Cir. 1973) 
9 Cohasset, Case No MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at II, citing National Radio Co., 198 
N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), motion for further consideration denied, 205 
N.L.R.B. No. ll2, 84 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1973). 
10 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 13. 
11 Id. at 11-12, citing National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 1, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 
(1972), motion for further consideration denied, 205 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 84 L.R.R.M. 
1105 (1973). 
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scribed below, the Commission will defer to arbitration whenever two 
basic conditions have been met: 
(I) the disputed issues are, in fact, issues susceptible to resolution 
under the operation of the grievance machinery agreed to by the 
parties, and (2) there is no reason to believe that use of that machin-
ery by the parties could not or would not resolve such issues in a 
manner compatible with the purposes of the Act.12 
The Commission did indicate that it will not apply its deferral policy 
in certain circumstances even where the above criteria have been met: 
(I) where the contract provisions for resolving the dispute provide criteria 
clearly inconsistent with the purposes of the state law;1s (2) where there 
is no provision for final and binding arbitration between the parties;1' 
(3) where, in response to a Commission inquiry, the respondent refuses 
to submit the dispute to arbitration; or (4) where the Commission finds 
that the employer is advocating deferral for the purpose of "attempting 
to undermine the representational status of an employee organization." 
In addition, deferral will not be regarded as appropriate where disputes 
over certain basic issues are involved, particularly including disputes over 
accretions of new employees to the bargaining unit,111 disputes over one 
of the party's requests for information,1a disputes over the employer's 
basic duty to recognize the union,17 disputes over the existence of a 
contract,1s and disputes involving unlawful contract provisions.19 Defer-
ral will also not be appropriate where the Commission finds that both 
parties to the collective bargaining may have interests inimical to the 
charging parties.2° Finally, recognizing that arbitration proceedings and 
the enforcement of arbitration awards can be expensive for a small 
union, the Commission noted that the parties' ability to pay· will be a 
factor .considered in deciding whether to order arbitration.21 
As on the federallevel,22 this new deferral policy will produce major 
12 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at U, citing Eastman Broadcasting 
Co., 199 N.LR.B. No. 58, 81 LR.R.M. 1257 (1972). 
18 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 197!1, at 14. 
14 Id. at 17,21 citing Whisenhunt Funeral Homes, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 106, 79 LR.R.M. 
1467 (1972). 
111 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 18, citing Combustion Engineering, 
Inc., 195 N.LR.B. No. 161, 79 LR.R.M. 1577 (1972). 
16 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 197!1, at 18. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 19. 
19 Id. 
20 Id., citing Kansas Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No.2, 80 LR.R.M. 1743 (1972). 
21 Cohasset, Case No. MUP-419, June 19, 1973, at 15, 17. 
22 Again, see Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.LR.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); 
Comment, 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 1!1 B.C. Ind. Be Com. L. 
Rev. 1!147, 1376-81 (1972). 
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changes in the procedures for resolving industrial disputes. Cities and 
towns will be encouraged to agree to compulsory arbitration clauses, 
but increased arbitration may drain local unions' small treasuries. Even 
though the opinion of the Commission recognizes this possibility, in 
practice the Commission may well be more sensitive to the pressures of 
its caseload than to the pressures on union treasuries. If so, the protec-
tions afforded by the Act will be undermined. 
§3.8. The Commission's duty to insure fair representation elections. 
Among other cases following NLRB precedents, the Commission in the 
Jordan Hospital case1 announced its adherence to the "laboratory condi-
tions" standard for policing the fairness of representation elections .. 
Citing General Shoe2 and Dal-Tex Optical Co.,• the Commission noted 
that elections could be set aside even if the offending party was not at 
fault and even if his actions did not constitute unfair labor practices. 
The Commission noted that in holding elections it was its "function to 
provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted under 
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited 
desires of the employees.''4 While most of the Jordan Hospital's actions 
did "fall short of committing an unfair labor practice,''11 the Commission 
found that the hospital's misrepresentations, its failure to provide an 
opportunity to rebut these misrepresentations, and the general climate 
of fear engendered by some of the hospital's actions justified the setting 
aside of the election. 
After the union won the subsequent representation election, the Com-
mission rejected the hospital's charges against the union. While noting 
that a minority of the present members of the National Labor Relations 
Board would ease the "laboratory conditions" standard,8 the Commission 
noted without elaboration that it is "not yet ready to adopt this theory 
••• ,"1 Since the union won the Jordan Hospital election by a margin 
in excess of ~wo-to-one, the Commission, again following federal prece-
dents, held that any union excesses could not have affected sufficient 
votes to frustrate the desires of the majority of the unit.s 
§3.9. Remedies for unfair labor practices and the definition of a 
labor organization. In another case decided in line with NLRB deci-
§5.8. 1 In re Jordan Hospital, Case No. 4-!1858, UP-2214, ratified July 25, 197!1. 
2 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 LR.R.M. 1!1!17 (1948). 
a 1!17 N.LR..B. 1782, 50 LR.R.M. 1489 (1962). 
' In re Jordan Hospital, Case No. 4-!1!158, UP-2214, ratified July 25, 197!1, at 7. 
II Id. 
e Id. at 8, citing Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 194 N.LR.B. 1014, 79 LR.R.M. 1148 (1972). 
1 In re Jordan Hospital, Case No. 4-!1!158, UP-2214 ratified July 25, 197!1, at 8. 
s Id. at 9, citing Overnite Transportation Co. v. NLRB, !127 F .2d !16, 55 L.R.R.M. 2126 
(4th Cir. 196!1): NLRB v. National Plastic Products Co., 175 F.2d 755, 24 L.R.R.M. 2155 
(4th Cir. 1949): NLRB v. Wilkening Manufacturing Co., 207 F.2d 98, !12 LR.R.M. 2664 
(lid Cir. 195!1). 
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sions, a case involving Cronin's Restaurant in Cambridge,1 the Commis-
sion observed that "[i]f the employee's discharge was. motivated wholly 
or even in part by his union activity, the Courts have held that discharge 
is still illegal despite the existence of adequate cause for discharge.''1 
Finding that· the restaurant's discharge of eight waitresses was motivated 
by their participation in union activities, the Commission ordered back 
pay from the time when they asked to return to their jobs.a Since there 
had been such a substantial drop in the employer's business, the Com-
mission ordered reinstatement of the employees on the basis of seniority, 
but only as new positions became available.• 
In another case, the Commission followed the NLRB's lead in holding 
that an informal organization without written rules or constitution can 
be a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.11 And, in yet 
another case, the Commission held that an employer could not exclude 
a representative of the international from its bargaining sessions.8 
§3.10. Municipal labor law: The duty to bargain in good faith. In 
the most important cases not involving NLRB precedents, the Commis-
sion outlined. the duty to bargain under G.L. c. 149, §§178L(l) and (4). 
In Town of Swampscott and Local 1459, International Association of 
Firefighters,! a number of the city's practices were held to constitute a 
refusal to bargain in good faith. The Commission regarded a refusal to 
discuss wages until seventeen days prior to the town meeting as "clearly" 
violative of the duty to bargain in good faith. The Board of Selectmen's 
refusal to bargain about working hours was also a violation, despite 
the Board's contention that this was within the sole discretion of the 
Fire Chief. Similarly, a violation was found in the fact that the Board 
of Selectmen stood silent when an agent of the town sponsored a by-law 
§!J.9. 1 Crimson Cafe, .Inc., DfB/A Cronin's Restaurant and Harvard Square 
Waitresses Organizing Comm., Case No. UP-2201, Jan. 16, 1975, appeal pending sub 
nom. Harvard Square Waitresses Organizing Committee v. Labor Relations Commission, 
Case No. Eq. 54715, Middlesex Superior Court. 
2 Id. at 7, citing NLRB v. Princeton Inn. Co., 424 F.2d 264, 75 LR.R.M. ll002 (lid 
Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Barberton Plastic Products, Inc., 554 F.2d 166, 61 L.R.R.M. 2049 
(6th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 885, 52 LR.R.M. 2201 (1st 
Cir. 1955). 
a The pri,ncipal federal case supporting such an order is Stackpole Carbon Co. v. 
NLRB, 105 F.2d 167 (lid Cir. 1959). 
• Crimson Cafe, Inc., Case No. UP-2201, Jan. 16, 1975, at 11-12, citing New York 
Ship Buildng Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 1446, 26 L.R.R.M. 1124 (1950): Sifers Candy Co., 92 
N.L.R.B. 1220, 27 LR.R.M. 1252 (1951); Hoffman Beverage Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 981, 65 
LR.R.M. 1011 (1967). 
II In re City of Lynn, Case No. MCR-1115, Feb. 7, 197ll, at 4, citing Jat Transporta-
tion Co., 128 N.LR.B. 780, 46 LR.R.M. 1405 (1960). 
t1 In re Brimfield School Committee, Case No. MUP-462, Feb. 16, 197ll, citing Oliver 
Corporation, 74 N.L.R.B. 485, 20 LR.R.M. 1185 (1947). 
§5.10. t In re Town of Swampsoott, Case No. MUP-550, Dec. 15, 1972. 
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inconsistent with the terms of the agreement reached between the Board 
of Selectmen and the union. 
In the Town of South Hadley case, the Commission indicated that 
when a selectman signs a collective bargaining agreement, even if he 
makes known his opposition to certain clauses, he cannot then in good 
faith oppose before the legislative body the necessary appropriations and 
implementing legislation. 2 
In a case involving the Board of Selectmen of Natick and a local repre-
senting its firemen,s the Commission found that the Board of Selectmen 
had failed to bargain in good faith because it refused to appoint the 
Chief of the Fire Department as a member of the city's collective bargain-
ing committee. It was noted that some of the local's demands could only 
be agreed upon by the Chief since he had sole authority to establish the 
system of shifts, the tours of duty, and the general assignment of men 
in the Fire Department.4 Given this authority, the Chief was under a 
duty to bargain, and the selectmen could not exclude him from the 
bargaining committee. 
In passing, the Commission also referred to the 1970 amendment to 
c. 149, §178I,5 which seemingly overruled the Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision in Chief of Police of Dracut v. Town of Dracut.6 In that case, 
the court found that any terms of a collective agreement which impinged 
upon the Police Chiefs statutory sole authority to decide duty, vacation 
and leave assignments were void. Since the new amendment had pro-
vided "that the provisions of any such [collective bargaining] agreement 
shall prevail over any regulation made by a chief of police pursuant 
to Section 97a of Chapter 41, or by the chief or any other head of a 
fire department under the provisions of Chapter 48,"7 the Commission 
noted that it "doubt[ed] that the Dracut case ... is any longer the law."s 
§3.11. Definition of "employees" for purposes of collective bargain-
ing. Finally, in a case presenting a question of first impression under 
the collective bargaining law for state employees, the Commission dis-
missed a representation petition filed by the Walpole Chapter of the 
National Prisoners' Reform Association.1 The Chapter sought recognition 
in a unit described as "all persons who are incarcerated in the Massachu-
setts Correctional Institution, Walpole, and who are employed by the 
2 In re Town of South Hadley, Case No. MUP-230, March 22, 1972. 
3 In re Board of Selectmen of the Town of Natick, Case No. MUP-441, Aug. 7, 19711. 
4 G.L. c. 48, §42. 
II Acts of 1970, c. 340. 
6 Chief of Police of Dracut v. Town of Dracut, 357 Mass. 492, 258 N.E.2d 531 (1970). 
7 Acts of 1970, c. 340. 
s In the matter of the Board of Selectmen of the Town of Natick and Local 1707, 
Int'l Association of Firefighters, Case No. MUP-441, Aug. 7, 1973, at 10. 
§3.11. 1 In re Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Case No. 
SCRX-2, Sept. 24, 1973. 
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Massachusetts Department of Corrections in the production of goods and 
services."2 The Commission admitted that these prisoners did fall within 
the literal definition of employees contained in §178F(l) of chapter 149. 
However, in view of the statutory powers given to the Commissioner of 
Corrections over the education, employment and training of the pris-
oners,a the Commission argued that it could not guarantee to prisoners 
the same rights which are guaranteed to regular employees of the Com-
monwealth and that therefore to declare that such prisoners are em-
ployees of the Commonwealth would be an "empty gesture.''4 Noting that 
prisoners in the past had not been considered covered under the per-
sonnel rules and regulations governing state employees,11 the Commission 
concluded that the Legislature had not intended to include the pris-
oners within the protections afforded by G.L. c. 149, §178F.6 
CoNCLUSION 
Thus, the developments in the labor law field in Massachusetts during 
the Survey year centered primarily upon the area of public, rather than 
private, labor relations. The Supreme Judicial Court issued several 
important decisions encompassing both jurisdictional and substantive 
areas of the law. Although these cases vested increased authority in the 
hands of the Labor Commission, defined more sharply the appropriate 
bargaining units in the public sector, and exemplified the growing judi-
cial deference to arbitration, their impact was cumulative rather than 
dramatic. Significantly, the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission 
also began to adopt more federal precedent, which course of action seems 
to indicate an increased reliance upon arbitration procedures. Indeed, 
the adoption of the Collyer principle was probably the year's most note-
worthy development. Still, 1973 was not a year of major departures in 
the labor field, and future developments, especially in the municipal area, 
will be henceforth shaped not so much by previous precedent as by 
chapter 1078 of the Acts of 1973, which restructures the law centering on 
public employees and their rights to enjoy the fruits of collective bar-
gaining.7 
2 Id. at 1. 
a Id. at 12·15, citing G.L c. 124, §I; c. 127, §§48, 48A, 49. 
4 In re Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Case No. 
SCRX-2, Sept. 24, 1978, at 16. While the Commission did not define this phrase, it is 
obvious that the political sensitivity of the issue precluded a traditional approach to 
the problem. 
II ld. at 16-18. 
8 Following past precedent, the Commission offered to conduct an election upon the 
request of both parties, even though it lacked jurisdiction to compel a representation 
election. Id. at 20·21. 
1 For a discussion of this new state labor relations law, see the author's forthcoming 
article, "A Preliminary Analysis of the New Public Employees' Law in Massachusetts," 
18 Boston Bar J. 5 Uan. 1974). 
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